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Abstract: This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are 
grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how 
S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. 
First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal 
relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural 
similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation 
using system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or 
detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important 
theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Antirepresentationalism has been one of the major recent trends in theorizing about the 
mind. Some modern antirepresentationalists employ a sort of trivializing argumentative 
strategy. That is, instead of (or in addition to) developing new theories of cognition that do 
without the notion of representation, they attempt to show that some of the most prevalent 
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existing notions of mental representation are not suited to do the theoretical jobs that are 
expected of them. In particular, the idea that representations are covariance-based indicators or 
detectors has been subjected to this sort of trivializing attack. It has been argued that detectors 
functionally boil down to mere causal mediators, and thus are not representations (Ramsey 
2007), or that they are not contentful (Hutto and Myin 2013). 
 One way that representationalists might want to oppose attempts to trivialize 
representations is to defend the status quo, for example, to argue that detectors are 
representations after all. But perhaps a different reaction is more justified and fruitful. Perhaps 
representationalists should treat the “trivializing” strand of antirepresentationalism as an 
opportunity to develop, strengthen, and indeed reform the mainstream understanding of what 
representations are so that the resulting new notion is no longer subject to the trivializing 
arguments. In fact, something like this sort of reaction is starting to take shape in the literature. 
This is because in parallel to antirepresentationalism, another trend in theorizing about 
representation has recently gained momentum, wherein people move away from seeing mental 
representations as indicators or detectors, and towards construing them in terms of internal 
models (Bartels 2006; Grush 2004; Isaac 2012; O’Brien 2014; O’Brien, Opie 2004; Ramsey 
2007; Rescorla 2009; Ryder 2004; Shagrir 2012; Shea 2014; three references omitted; for 
earlier treatments, see also Craik 1943; Grush 1996; Cummins 1996). Here, the model is 
understood as an internal structural representation, i.e., a representation grounded in structural 
similarity1 between the representation itself and its target. Here, we want to address two crucial 
issues that arise in the context of this approach to representation. 
 Our first concern is with the idea that S-representations come into play when structural 
similarity can be actively exploited or relied upon by a cognitive system or mechanism. In other 
                                                             
1 Although structural similarity has been variously defined, usually the definitions revolve around the common 
idea that the relation in question is constituted by the existence of a (at least partial) structure-preserving mapping 
between two entities. In the present paper, we will assume the following definition (O’Brien and Opie 2004, p. 
11): 
 “Suppose SV = (V, V ) is a system comprising a set V of objects, and a set V of 
relations defined on the members of V. (...) We will say that there is a second-order 
[structural] resemblance between two systems SV = (V, V) and SO = (O, O) if, 
for at least some objects in V and some relations in V, there is a one-to-one mapping 
from V to O and a one-to-one mapping from V to O such that when a relation in 
V holds of objects in V, the corresponding relation in O holds of the corresponding 
objects in O.” 
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words, similarity relations that give rise to S-representations are exploitable similarities 
(Godfrey-Smith 1996; Shea 2007, 2014). There are at least two reasons to think that the notion 
of exploitable similarity is of crucial importance for theorizing about S-representation. First, it 
demonstrates that S-representations do not have to be construed in terms of passive, 
pragmatically detached “mirrors of nature.” Second, the notion can prove useful in resolving 
problems that seemingly plague similarity-based theories of representation. For example, one 
might claim that because of the ubiquity and “cheapness” of structural similarity, similarity-
based theories imply a problematic panrepresentationalism. But this can be avoided if we cut 
down the class of representation-relevant similarities to exploitable similarities (see Ramsey 
2007; Shea 2007, 2014). However, even though the very notion of similarity as an exploitable 
relation is by no means new in the literature, to our knowledge it has never been elaborated in 
detail. Some authors (e.g., Ramsey 2007) characterize the role of similarity by appealing to 
explanatory considerations, i.e., to the fact that invoking similarity is sometimes necessary to 
understand the successful operations of cognitive agents. But as it stands, this approach seems 
compatible with views which treat representation talk as a purely instrumental “gloss” (Egan 
2014), or ones that treat representational claims as fictions, i.e., as not literally true (see Sprevak 
2013). In the present paper (Section 2), we want to propose a precise, as well as more 
metaphysically committed interpretation of exploitable similarity, one which results in a firmly 
realist treatment of S-representations. Using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the 
interventionist theory of causal relevance, we claim that exploitable similarity is causally 
relevant for the successful operation of a cognitive mechanism (Section 2.1). Then we show 
that this causal role is indeed properly attributed to the relation of similarity as such, and does 
not boil down to the role played by the representational vehicle alone (Section 2.2). 
 The second aim of the paper is to critically examine the recent skepticism about whether 
S-representations are in fact distinct from detectors or indicators. In particular, Morgan (2014) 
has argued that under scrutiny, S-representations turn out to be functionally equivalent to 
detectors. If this is true, it would mean that there is no theoretically significant distinction to be 
made between the two. In particular, it would turn out that it is a mistake to think that S-
representations act as internal models, which, on the face of it, is importantly different from 
acting as an indicator or detector. Furthermore, if S-representations are in fact indistinguishable 
from detectors, then it could be argued that the former fall under the same trivializing arguments 
as the latter. Nonetheless, we will argue (in Section 3) that there is an important distinction to 
be made here after all. We start by presenting the reasoning behind the criticism of the S-
representation/detector distinction, and then lay out a way of delineating S-representations from 
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detectors. Our proposal appeals to (1) the crucial role that the similarity of structures plays in 
S-representations but not in detectors, and (2) the fact that S-representing, as a strategy of 
guiding action and cognition, is not purely reactive (as is the case with mere detectors), but 
involves an endogenous source of control.  
 
2. Exploiting structural similarity: a mechanistic-interventionist account 
 
2.1. Exploitable similarity as causally relevant similarity 
 
 It is usually recognized that the mere existence of structural similarity between two 
entities is by no means sufficient to confer on one of those entities the status of representation. 
S-representations only come into play when a cognitive system depends, in some nontrivial 
sense, on the relation of similarity in its engagements with its representational targets. As 
Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Shea (2007, 2014) put this, the correspondence (here, the structural 
similarity) between representation and its target should be understood as “fuel for success” or 
a resource that enables organisms to “get things done” in the world. In other words, similarity 
should be understood as a relation that is exploitable for some larger representation-using 
system. We now want to address the question of what it means exactly for structural similarity 
to be exploitable. In particular, we will try to clarify this idea in the context of purely 
subpersonal S-representations of the sort that we could find inside a mechanical system such as 
a human brain.  
 Let us start by taking a closer look at the basic, commonsense intuition that underlies 
the notion of exploitable similarity. Consider an external, artifactual S-representation such as a 
cartographic map. We can at least sometimes explain someone’s success at navigating a 
particular territory by pointing to the fact that the person in question used an accurate map of 
this territory (and vice versa, we can explain someone’s navigational failure by citing the fact 
that the person in question used an inaccurate map). Users of cartographic maps owe their 
success to the similarity that holds between the spatial structure of the representation and the 
spatial structure of the territory it represents (analogously, the failures can be due to the lack of 
similarity between the representation and what is represented). This link between similarity and 
success generalizes to all S-representations, including, we claim, the ones that do not require 
interpretation by a human being. 
 On the view we are proposing, explanations of success that invoke the similarity 
between the representation and its target can be true in virtue of similarity being causally 
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relevant to success. That is, the structural correspondence can quite literally cause the 
representation-user to be successful at whatever she (or it) is using the representation for, and 
lack of structural correspondence can cause the user to fail at whatever she (or it) is using the 
representation for. Explanations that invoke S-representations should thus be construed as 
causal explanations that feature facts regarding similarity as an explanans and success or failure 
as an explanandum. To exploit structural similarity in this sense is to use a strategy whose 
success is causally dependent on structural similarity between the representational vehicle2 and 
what is represented. 
 Our treatment invokes two concepts that are in need of clarification, especially when 
applied to internal, subpersonal representations: the notion of success/failure (for which 
similarity is causally responsible), and the notion of causal relevance. We will now concentrate 
on each of these notions in turn. Let us start with success and failure.  
 The idea that human agents can succeed or fail at whatever they use S-representations 
for seems straightforward enough and we will not dwell on it here. But how to understand 
success/failure in the case of internal, subpersonal representations of the sort that are of interest 
to us here? We propose to look at the problem through the lens of the prominent neomechanistic 
theory of explanation, as applied to cognitive-scientific explanation (Boone and Piccinini 2015; 
Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007). Neomechanists see the cognitive system as a collection of 
mechanisms. A mechanism is a set of organized components and component operations which 
jointly enable the larger system to exhibit a certain phenomenon (often understood as a capacity 
of this system). Mechanisms in this sense are at least partly individuated functionally, that is, 
by reference to the phenomenon that they give rise to—they are essentially mechanisms of this 
or that cognitive function (mindreading, motor control, attention, perceptual categorization, 
                                                             
2 As one reviewer pointed out to us, there are two ways of understanding the vehicles of S-representations. On the 
first interpretation, the vehicle is the whole S-representation, e.g. a model or a map as such. On the second 
interpretation, endorsed by Ramsey (2007), only components of larger structures (say, symbols placed within a 
map) are treated as the S-representational vehicles. These components represent by serving as stand-ins for their 
targets within a larger structure. Now, these two approaches are closely related, as the possibility of treating 
components as stands-ins presupposes the existence of structural similarity between the larger representing 
structure and the represented structure. We think that that the choice between the two interpretations should be a 
matter of one’s explanatory or theoretical agenda. In the present paper, our concern is with the role played by 
structural similarity. This relation of interest for us holds between the relational structure of the representation as 
whole and some represented target.  Therefore, here, we choose to treat the whole representing structure as the 
vehicle of S-representation. We admit, though, that given different aims, the component-centered interpretation 
might be preferable. 
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spatial navigation, etc.). Components and operations derive their functional characterization 
from the function of the larger mechanism they are embedded in. That is, the function of a 
component is determined by an operation such that it is through the performance of this 
particular operation that the component in question contributes to a phenomenon for which the 
larger mechanism is responsible (see Craver 2007). This is why, say, the function of the heart 
as a component of a mechanism responsible for blood circulation lies in its pumping blood, and 
not in its emitting rhythmic sounds; it is the former, and not the latter operation through which 
the heart contributes to blood circulation. 
 The vehicles of internal S-representations can be treated as components of cognitive 
mechanisms, and are targets of various cognitive operations. Each mechanism equipped with 
an S-representation as its component part underlies a certain phenomenon, i.e., some cognitive 
capacity. S-representations construed as mechanism components owe their functional 
characterization to how they contribute to the phenomenon that the larger mechanism is 
responsible for. What we mean by this is, essentially, that structural similarity between the 
representation and what it represents is what contributes toward the mechanism’s proper 
functioning. To put it more precisely, any mechanism responsible for some capacity C which 
includes an S-representation as its component can fail to realize or enable C as a result of the 
fact that the component in question is not (sufficiently) structurally similar to the 
representational target; and analogously, when the mechanism succeeds at realizing or enabling 
C, this is at least in part due to the fact that this component is (sufficiently) structurally similar 
to the target. So structural similarity is causally relevant to success/failure because the ability 
of any S-representation-involving mechanism to perform its function depends on the degree of 
structural similarity between the representational vehicle and the target. Success and failure are 
treated here as success or failure at contributing to some function or capacity of a mechanism. 
 We now turn to the question of what it means for similarity to be causally relevant to 
success (or failure) thus understood. Here we aim to make use of James Woodward’s (2003, 
2008) popular interventionist theory of causal relevance.3 It is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion to present Woodward’s theory in detail so a rough sketch will have to suffice. The 
core idea behind the interventionist view is that claims of causal relevance connect two 
                                                             
3 Following Carl Craver’s (2009) work, we take it that the interventionist account of causal relevance can be 
reconciled with the neomechanist view of explanation. More specifically, we assume that the component’s 
contribution to the function of the mechanism as a whole can be understood in terms of this component’s being 
causally relevant for the function in question, where causal relevance is construed along the interventionist lines. 
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variables, say, X and Y.4 What it takes for X to be causally relevant to Y is that appropriate 
interventions into X (i.e., interventions that change the value of X) are associated with changes 
in Y (i.e., the values of Y):  
 
(M) X causes Y if and only if there are background circumstances 
B such that if some (single) intervention that changes the value of 
X (and no other variable) were to occur in B, then Y would change 
(see Woodward 2003, 2008) 
 
The intervention in question can be helpfully understood as an experimental manipulation of X 
in controlled settings, although Woodward’s theory does not require human agency to be 
involved in establishing causal relations—any change of the value of X could potentially count 
as an intervention, even one that is not dependent at all on human action. Importantly, there are 
certain conditions that an intervention must meet in order to establish a causal connection 
between X and Y. For example, the intervention must not change the value of Y through any 
causal route except the one that leads through X (e.g., it must not change the value of Y directly 
or by directly changing the value of a variable that mediates causally between X and Y) and it 
must not be correlated with any causes of Y other than X or those that lie on the causal route 
from X to Y. 
 By employing the interventionist view, we can now understand the causal relevance of 
similarity for success in the following way. The structural similarity between the 
representational vehicle and the target is causally relevant for success by virtue of the fact that 
interventions in similarity would be associated with changes in the success of whatever capacity 
that is based on, or guided by the representation in question. That is, manipulations on similarity 
would also be manipulations on the ability of the representation-user—be it a human being or 
some internal cognitive mechanism—to be successful at whatever she or it is employing the 
representation for. 
 To make this proposal more precise, let us apply (M) to the similarity-success relation. 
The variable X corresponds to similarity between the vehicle and what is represented. It would 
probably be a gross simplification if we treated X as a binary variable, with one value 
corresponding to the existence, and the other to the lack of similarity. Luckily, structural 
                                                             
4 The variables and different values they take admit many ontological interpretations, i.e., they could stand-in for 
properties, processes, events, states of affairs, etc. 
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similarity can be easily construed as a gradable relation, depending on the degree to which the 
structure of one relatum actually preserves the structure of the another relatum (see note 1; for 
another account that explicitly defines similarity as coming in degrees, see: Tversky 1977; 
Weisberg 2013). This way we can treat X as capable of taking a range of values {X1, X2, ..., 
Xn}, where each increasing value corresponds to an increased degree of similarity between the 
vehicle and the target. Therefore, between the lack of any similarity and a complete structural 
indistinguishability, there is a range of intermediate possibilities. 
 What about Y, the variable that corresponds to success/failure? As far as we can see, S-
representations could turn out to feature in a diverse set of mechanisms which give rise to a 
diverse set of cognitive functions, like motor control and motor planning, perceptual 
categorization, mindreading, decision making, etc. Now, cognitive systems can be more or less 
effective at realizing each such function: they can perform better or worse at motor control and 
planning, perceptually categorizing objects, attributing mental states, making decisions, etc. In 
this sense, we can treat the variable Y as corresponding to degrees of success of the mechanism 
in question at enabling an effective performance of a given capacity. Increasing values of Y = 
{Y1, Y2, ..., Yn} would correspond to increasing degrees of success thus understood. But what 
sorts of values can we have in mind exactly? Here we want to remain as open as possible. Any 
scientifically respectable way of measuring success can do. For example, the success could be 
measured by the average frequency of instances of a certain level of performance at some 
cognitive task, or the probability of a certain level of performance at some task, or a distribution 
of probabilities of possible levels of performance at some task, etc. The details will always 
depend on the sort of function in question, as well as on the experimental paradigm used to test 
or measure it.  
 We may now formulate our thesis as follows. For similarity to cause success, 
interventions into the value of X (which corresponds to the degree of structural similarity 
between the representational vehicle and what it represents) should result in systematic changes 
in the value of Y (which corresponds to the degree of success of the mechanism that makes use 
of an S-representation in performing its mechanistic function or capacity). In particular, by 
intervening in X so that its value increases, we should increase the value of Y; and by 
intervening in X so that its value decreases, we should decrease the value of Y. 
Before we move on, it needs to be noted that the relationship between similarity and 
success is nuanced in the following way. Good S-representations resemble relevant parts of the 
world only partially. Maps never mirror the territory in all its detail; instead, they are 
intentionally simplified, selective, and even distorted. The same applies to subpersonal S-
9 
 
representations. There are at least two reasons to think that. First, S-representations that 
resemble the target too much become excessively complex themselves. We should then expect 
there to be a trade-off between a representation’s structural complexity and the temporal or 
computational resources (costs) that real-life cognitive systems have at their disposal. It is 
doubtful that limited agents could generate S-representations that come even close to mirroring 
the structural complexities of the world. Second, in a world as complex as ours, generating 
maximally accurate S-representations tends to result in overfitting the data, which decreases the 
representation’s predictive value (this latter point applies to S-representations that are statistical 
models of the environment). 
This general observation can be expressed using our preferred interventionist 
framework. Suppose that increasing values of variable X correspond to increasing structural 
similarity between the vehicle and what is represented, and the increasing values of variable Y 
correspond to increasing success. Now, to accommodate our point, we may say that although 
in real-life cases of S-representation, there is a positive causal relation between X and Y, it only 
holds within a limited range of values of X. For simplicity, we may suppose that the relation 
holds from the lowest value of X to some specific larger value, but it disappears when X exceeds 
this value. That is, once the value of X exceeds a certain level, then (e.g. due to low cost-
effectiveness or overfitting) its relationship to Y breaks down, e.g. increasing the value of X 
may begin to decrease the value of Y. Crucially, the lesson to be drawn here is not that similarity 
is functionally irrelevant, but simply that too much similarity can render the S-representation 
inefficient at serving its purpose. Our proposal is therefore that structural similarity is causally 
relevant only in a certain range, and the exact range depends on the overall structural trade-offs 
of the similarity-based system. 
 The following empirical illustration should illuminate our view. In the philosophical 
literature, hippocampal spatial maps in rats have been proposed as a good example of an internal 
S-representation (Ramsey 2015; Rescorla 2009; Shea 2014). The rat’s hippocampus is thought 
to implement an internal map of the spatial layout of the environment, encoded in a Cartesian 
coordinate system. According to this hypothesis, the co-activation patterns of so-called place 
cells in the hippocampus correspond to the spatial structure of the rat’s environment (Shea 
2014). That is, the pattern of co-activation relationships between place cells (roughly, the 
tendency of particular cells to show joint activity) resembles the structure of metric relations 
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between locations within the environment.5 This hippocampal map constitutes a component of 
a cognitive mechanism which underlies the ability to navigate the environment (Craver 2007). 
The rat’s capacity to find its way within the environment, even in the absence of external cues 
or landmarks, depends on the fact that it has an internal mechanism equipped with a map of the 
terrain. This capacity for navigation is usually tested by verifying the rat’s ability to find a 
reward (food) within a maze in which the animal has no reliable access to external orientation 
points (see Craver (2007) and Redish (1999) for reviews).  
 As has been already argued in the literature, spatial navigation using hippocampal maps 
is an instance in which the structural similarity between the map and the territory is being 
actively exploited by the organism (Shea 2014). Similarity serves as a resource that the rat 
depends on in its dealings with problems that require spatial navigation. Our proposal provides 
what we think is a clear and precise interpretation of this claim. The map-world similarity is 
causally relevant to the rat’s success at finding its way in the environment. This means that we 
could manipulate the rat’s capacity to navigate in space by intervening in the degree to which 
its internal map resembles structurally (the relevant part of) the environment. We know, for 
example, that rats are quite efficient at constructing and storing separate maps for particular 
mazes (Alme et al. 2014). We may imagine an experiment in which we place the rat in a 
previously-learned maze and then intervene on the co-activation structure of place cells in a 
way that distorts (i.e., decreases) the structural correspondence between the map and the maze 
to a particular degree. If the similarity is really being exploited, then intervention of this sort 
should decrease the rat’s ability to navigate the particular territory, and we should be able to 
observe and measure this decrease by investigating the change in the rat’s performance at 
finding rewards in the maze. What is more, the rat’s navigational capacity (variable Y) should 
be reduced to a degree which is in proportion to the degree to which we decreased similarity 
(X) between its internal map and the spatial structure of the maze. And crucially, our 
                                                             
5 It needs to be stressed that the similarity exists purely in virtue of the existence of the structure-preserving 
mapping between the relata (see note 1). O’Brien and Opie (2004) call this a “second-order” resemblance, as it is 
not required that the relata, i.e., structures related by way of similarity, are of the same physical type. For example, 
a structure of a spatial arrangement and directionality of arrows on a diagram may resemble a structure of causal 
relationships in some domain. Analogously, in our hippocampal map example, the similarity does not have hold 
between the spatial structure of the environment and the spatial layout of neurons. Rather, the resemblance holds 
between a spatial structure and a neural co-activation structure which implements a coordinate space (see Shea 
2014).  
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intervention should change the rat’s performance only insofar as it constitutes an intervention 
on similarity as such. 
 
2.2.  Is similarity really causally relevant? 
 
 The following issue might well be raised in the context of our mechanistic-
interventionist treatment of the notion of exploitable similarity. One could wonder whether it is 
really similarity as such that is causally relevant to success. Notice that it is impossible to 
perform an intervention on the similarity relation in any way other than by intervening in the 
structure of at least one of its relata (here, the representational vehicle or the represented target). 
But this invites a worry. Would it not be much more parsimonious to simply state that what is 
causally relevant for success are structural properties of the vehicle and/or the target? After all, 
it is by intervening in either of them that we manipulate success. Why bother attributing the 
causal role to similarity itself? For example, to change a rat’s performance at navigating mazes, 
it will suffice to intervene on the hippocampal map. Why not simply say that it is the structure 
of the map (the representational vehicle) that is causally relevant to the rat’s success at spatial 
navigation? Why treat the relation between the map and the environment as causally relevant? 
 To reply to this objection, we need to be careful to make the distinction between 
interventions that change the way some cognitive system acts (behaviorally or cognitively) and 
interventions that change the success of its actions. The change of action can, but does not have 
to change the success of the organism at whatever it is doing. If the change in the way the 
system acts is accompanied by an appropriate change in the external environment, the success 
can stay at the same level (e.g., we could change the rat’s behavior in a maze without changing 
its ability to find food if the maze itself changes accordingly). At the same time, the same 
manipulation of action can change the success of the organism either by increasing it or 
decreasing it—again, the direction of influence will depend on properties of the environment 
(e.g., on the structure of the maze that the rat is traversing). So there is no context-free, one-to-
one correspondence between action and success. The reason for this is that success and failure 
in the sense we are using are essentially ecological categories. They co-depend both on what a 
given system is doing, and on the world within which it is doing it.  
 Notice now that by concentrating solely on the properties of the representational vehicle, 
we would completely miss the point just made. Surely, interventions in the structural properties 
of the vehicle (e.g., the hippocampal map) would change the cognitive system’s actions (e.g., 
the rat’s behavior when placed in a maze). That much is not debatable. But manipulating actions 
12 
 
is not the same as manipulating success. Because of this, the effect that the structure of the 
vehicle has on action does not imply that the same sort of relationship exists between the 
vehicle’s structure and success. It is impossible to say how manipulating the vehicle’s structure 
(and so the organism’s action) will change success independently of facts about the target; or 
more precisely, independently of the facts regarding structural similarity between the vehicle 
and the target. In other words, interventions on the vehicle’s structure change the success only 
insofar as they change the degree of similarity between the vehicle and the target. They increase 
success if they increase the structural fit between the vehicle and the target. They decrease 
success only if they decrease the structural fit. And they do not change the success if they do 
not bring about any change in the structural fit. In any case, what the success depends on is not 
just the vehicle, but also structural similarity. Of course, again, the only way to intervene on 
similarity is by manipulating the relata. But it is just wrong to conclude from this that similarity 
itself is not what is causally relevant here. 
 Let us formulate our point using some technicalities of Woodward’s account of causal 
relevance. Suppose that the independent variable X corresponds not to similarity between the 
vehicle and the target, but to purely vehicular-structural properties of the representation. More 
precisely, imagine that each value of X corresponds to a different potential structural pattern of 
the vehicle, regardless of its relationship to anything outside the mechanism. The dependent 
variable Y remains the same, i.e., it measures the degree of success at realizing some capacity. 
Now, there are certain constraints that Woodward (2003) puts on any scientifically respectable 
causal relationships. Two of them are relevant for our present purposes. First, interventions 
should not simply effect some changes in Y. Rather, the relation between X and Y should be 
systematic in that we should be able to establish which values of X correspond to which values 
of Y. Second, the relationship between X and Y should be stable, viz. it should hold across a 
wide range of different background conditions. But notice that neither of those constraints is 
met on the interpretation of X and Y that we are now considering. First, because of the reasons 
we mentioned above, there is no clear mapping from values of X to values of Y, which prevents 
the relationship between those variables from being systematic in the relevant sense. Setting X 
at some value could well increase the value of Y, decrease it or even not change it all. Second, 
the relation between X and Y is by no means stable. In fact, it is fundamentally unstable because 
of how dependent it is on the states of the environment. It is not possible to say how 
manipulation of X will change the value of Y independently of the state of the target. Again, 
the same manipulation of X (e.g., setting the structure of the spatial map in the hippocampus) 
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could bring about drastically different results depending on external circumstances (e.g., 
depending on the spatial structure of the maze that the rat navigates). 
 Both Woodward’s constraints are however met if we go back to our original view and 
consider the variable X to correspond to the degree of similarity between the representational 
vehicle and the target. The relation between X and Y is then both systematic and stable. It is 
systematic because we can map increasing values of X onto increasing values of Y. And it is 
stable at least in the sense that it cannot be broken down by changes in the target. After all, the 
value of X itself partially depends precisely on properties of the target.6 Overall, we think that 
these considerations provide strong reasons to think that in an S-representational mechanism, 
what is causally relevant to success is really the relation of structural similarity. 
 
3. S-representations vs. detectors revisited 
 
Let us now turn our attention to the problem of distinguishing S-representations proper from 
mere detectors or indicators. Some authors challenge the very notion that there is a genuine 
distinction to be made here (Morgan 2014) because they think that one cannot differentiate 
systems or mechanisms that operate on the basis of covariance from ones that exploit structural 
similarity. It is claimed that when some system or mechanism operates by using a detector 
whose states reliably covary with states of the target, it is straightforwardly possible to show 
that the system or mechanism in question relies on the similarity that holds between the 
detector’s structure and some target. Consider the notorious thermostat, equipped with a bi-
metallic strip whose shape reliably reacts to (hence, covaries with) variations in the ambient 
temperature, and, in turn, switches the thermostat’s furnace to keep the temperature at a certain 
level. It is usually claimed that if it is even justified to treat it as a representation (which is far 
from uncontroversial in itself, see (Ramsey 2007, Ch. 4), the bi-metallic strip counts as, at most, 
a detector or an indicator of some state of affairs. However, on closer inspection, it turns out 
that reliable causal covariance is not the only relation that connects the strip to ambient 
temperature. They are also related by way of structural similarity (see also O’Brien 2014). 
Namely, there exists a structure-preserving mapping between the pattern of the bi-metallic 
                                                             
6 Of course, even in this case the causal relation between the two variables only holds within a certain set of 
background circumstances. For example, X can be said to be causally relevant to Y only if other 
(nonrepresentational) parts of the representation-involving mechanism are working properly. Nonetheless, we take 
it that the class of conditions under which this causal relation remains stable is wide enough for this relation to be 
of scientific value. 
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strip’s possible shapes and the pattern of possible variations in ambient temperature. 
Furthermore, it may seem that the thermostat would not have the ability to adapt its behavior to 
the changing environment without the existence of a mapping between the metal strip and 
ambient temperature. Perhaps, then, we should regard the thermostat as a device that makes use 
of an S-representation after all? Or is there a genuine theoretical distinction to be made here at 
all? Maybe the conclusion to make is that detectors “just are” S-representations (Morgan 2014)? 
This is a serious challenge for anyone who wants to see construing representation in 
terms of exploitable similarity as significantly different, and perhaps also deeper in some 
important ways than construing it in terms of indication or detection. Nonetheless, we want to 
argue that there is, in fact, a principled way of drawing the distinction between S-representations 
and detectors. We claim that there are two fundamental differences between S-representations 
and detectors in virtue of which the distinction is justified. The first difference pertains to the 
fact that that although detectors can exhibit structural resemblance to their targets, this relation 
is not relevant for their workings in quite the same way that it is relevant in the case of S-
representations proper.7 The second difference relates to what distinguishes the functioning of 
S-representations from the way detectors function. We discuss those differences in turn. 
Regarding the first difference, let us reconsider the thermostat example. One can ascribe 
the structure to the bi-metallic strip because of the relations between different shapes that it can 
take depending on the surrounding temperature. But notice that for a system such as the 
thermostat, it is not necessary or essential for the relational structure of possible indicator states 
to replicate the relations between different variants of ambient temperature in any particular 
way. Of course, it is the case that, say, the strip curvature that indicates 33 degrees Celsius is 
closer to the one that indicates 34 degrees than to the one that indicates 17 degrees. But we can 
imagine an intervention in a thermostat which breaks this structural resemblance while leaving 
the thermostat’s workings intact. We may imagine that following this intervention, the detector 
strip reacts to the temperature being 33 degrees by taking shape that is closer to the one that 
corresponds to 17 degrees than to the one that corresponds to 34 degrees. However, this fact is 
simply irrelevant as long as the 33-degree-detector-state is specific to the environmental 
circumstances, such that (1) the detector enters this state as result of the temperature being 33 
degrees, (2) it switches the furnace into a state that is appropriate or functional given the 
temperature being 33 degrees. The relation that this state bears to other states is irrelevant or 
accidental. To generalize, in detectors or indicators, the relations between alternative detector 
                                                             
7 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for urging us to include this difference in our discussion. 
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states need not replicate the relational pattern of the target. In this sense, the relation of structural 
similarity is epiphenomenal in their case: as such, it does not play a role in enabling the detector 
system to work properly. 
By contrast, an S-representation cannot do its job (i.e., enable success) without being 
structurally similar to the target. Here, the pattern of relations between components of the S-
representation plays a crucial role. For example, a map—be it artifactual map or neurally-
realized cognitive map—needs to stand in a structural resemblance relation to the terrain if it is 
to perform its S-representational job; and any figure placed within a map can act as an S-
representational surrogate only insofar as it stands in certain relations to other figures or lines 
on the map. In other words, in S-representations, the structure (i.e., the relational pattern) of the 
vehicle—and the resemblance that it bears to the target structure—plays a major role which is 
missing in the case of detectors.   
The second difference that underlies the S-representation/detector distinction does not 
pertain to the nature of the relation that connects the representational vehicle to its target. 
Rather, it relates to what distinguishes the functioning of S-representations from the way 
detectors function. 
 Let us start with a simple illustration. Consider two people facing the problem of 
navigating their way from one location to another in a city. Person A has traversed this route 
many times in the past, to the point that she does not need to elaborately plan how to reach her 
destination. All that she has to do is to react, at appropriate times and in appropriate ways, to 
particular environmental cues and landmarks (say, by turning left upon seeing a church, then 
right at the second crossing, etc.). Her navigational choices are fully dictated or determined by 
the territory itself: all that she does is respond to it in ways which enable her to eventually reach 
the destination. Now, person B has no previous experience with the city and so traverses the 
same route using satellite navigation. In the case of person B, it is not possible to explain her 
success at reaching the destination by simply pointing to how she reacts to environmental cues. 
This is because her ongoing navigational decisions depend on what happens in the navigation 
system. What guides B’s actions are the system-derived anticipations and instructions, not the 
world itself. There surely are purely “receptive” aspects to using satellite navigation—B 
obviously needs to interact with the environment itself in order to verify satellite-based 
suggestions, and the system’s receiver must itself interact with the satellite to track B’s current 
position. However, there is an important sense in which person B’s actions are controlled by 
the satellite navigation itself, as opposed to being fully controlled by the terrain. 
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Here is our point. The strategy employed by person A is representative of what is crucial, 
from a functional standpoint, to cognitive strategies that employ detectors. In detector-based 
strategies, the represented part of the world constitutes the locus of control of an action or a 
cognitive process. Detectors are functionally bound to their targets. This is because all the there 
is to working as a detector or indicator is to be causally selective in useful ways. Detectors tend 
to react exclusively to certain states of affairs, and, in turn, generate cognitive or behavioral 
responses that are appropriate given the circumstances. This the case with the thermostat as a 
detector-based mechanism: its bi-metallic strip reacts or responds to the target in a way that is 
useful to the larger mechanism. The way the thermostat behaves is under the control of the 
environment itself. 
One important thing to note here is that the “causal selectivity” at issue can be realized 
in ways other than through direct causal relation between the detector and its purported target. 
It could be established by indirect, mediated causal chain, or by the detector and the target 
sharing a common cause. In yet other cases, the detector may be causally related to a state which 
is merely spatiotemporally correlated with the target. Take, for instance, magnetosomes in 
magnetotactic bacteria. Magnetosomes react causally to the magnetic North; but given that the 
magnetic North is reliably correlated with the location of oxygen-free water, they can drive the 
bacteria towards its preferred environment. Here the detector is already causally disconnected 
from what it supposedly detects (the target). Still, its workings boil down to being reactive to 
the environment in useful ways. 
 On the contrary, using S-representations is not a matter of simply selectively reacting to 
targets. In our toy example, this is apparent in person B’s case in that it is not the environment 
itself, but rather what happens in satellite navigation that constitutes the locus of control of the 
navigation process. To generalize this point, what is characteristic of S-representation-based 
strategies is that they employ an internal or endogenous source of control over action or 
cognitive processes; they are, so to speak, active, and not simply reactive strategies (for an 
illuminating discussion of endogenously active mechanisms in nature, see Bechtel 2005, Ch. 
6). Furthermore, what is also crucial is that processes or manipulations over S-representations 
exhibit a certain degree of functional freedom from their targets—freedom which is absent in 
the case of detectors. That is, the way the S-representation gets manipulated or updated is 
endogenously controlled; it depends on the internal set-up of the S-representations itself and is 
not dictated (although it may be affected) by the causal coupling with the target. Again, what 
satellite navigation system anticipates to be the case as one traverses the terrain is not (just) a 
matter of what happens in the world, but (also) of what is encoded in the map itself.  
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 One of the major consequences of S-representations’ being endogenously-controlled 
and functionally free in the sense described above is that they can naturally perform their duties 
even when the processes that they undergo do not correlate with any concurrent target or 
represented processes; that is, when the S-representation cannot be said to track anything that 
actually takes place. In other words, S-representations can perform their function even if they 
do not change “in response” to targets—at least on any useful or illuminating interpretation of 
what “in response” could possibly mean in this context. Take S-representations which function 
in a robustly off-line manner. In such cases, the represented entity could be so spatiotemporally 
distant from the representation user so as to count as absent for it (Clark and Toribio 1994). Just 
think of a person who manipulates an interactive digital map in order to plan a future trip, or 
even to consider some route purely counterfactually. In this strong sense, deploying S-
representations off-line consists of manipulating them for the purpose of representing things 
located in the distant past, future, or ones that are merely counterfactual. Notice also how in the 
case of (S-)representing future and counterfactual states of affairs, there is no possibility—at 
least not without some serious metaphysical gymnastics—of saying that the representation is 
reactive to what is represented (after all, the latter is nonexistent at the time the representation 
is employed).8  
 One might raise the question of how this functional story about S-representations relates 
to the story about exploitable similarity. To answer this issue, we need to note that being an 
endogenously-controlled process is not sufficient for this process to count as employing S-
representation. Exploitable similarity needs to be involved. 
 Let us elucidate this point by showing how structural similarity is exploited in cases of 
S-representations that are used off-line, this time concentrating on subpersonal representations 
of the sort that could feature in cognitive mechanisms. Three ingredients are involved in the 
off-line use of an S-representation thus construed. First, the S-representation is actively 
transformed or manipulated within the mechanism. That is, the S-representational vehicle 
undergoes an endogenously-controlled process in which its structure changes over time. The 
                                                             
8 Importantly, we are not claiming that the possibility of off-line use itself is what distinguishes S-representations 
from detectors. Rather, we treat this fact about S-representations as resulting from them being functionally 
disconnected from their targets. Our claim is simply that, from an engineering standpoint, S-representations are 
naturally poised to subserve off-line cognition. However, we do not want to wholesale deny that there may be 
some sense in which indicators could function off-line, e.g. when the causal chain that leads from the target 
appearing to the detector entering some state is so long or slow that once the detector enters this state, the target is 
no longer present in the environment. 
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structure of the vehicle is being effectively put to use. Second, manipulations of this sort are 
employed by the larger mechanism to perform a certain function. For example, the effects of 
manipulations could serve (for some consumer component) as a basis for a decision about which 
course of action—out of some possible range—to take. Third, and crucially, the degree to which 
the effects of such manipulations of the S-representational vehicle’s structure are actually 
functional should depend causally on how well those manipulations and their outcomes 
resemble targets. That is, if they are to successfully guide action or cognition, the internal 
manipulations need to actually resemble or simulate how corresponding target processes would 
unfold. 
 Take the rat’s spatial navigation system again. First, it has been suggested that place 
cells in a hippocampal spatial map can fire in sequences in a purely off-line manner, e.g., when 
the rat is asleep or is planning a route (see Johnson, Redish 2007; Pffeifer and Foster 2013; 
Shea 2014). The map is internally manipulated and the firing sequences correspond to routes 
that the rat could take when navigating an actual territory. Second, these manipulations are 
functional for the navigational mechanism in that they (presumably) serve as a basis for route 
planning. Perhaps alternative routes leading to a reward are simulated in order to select one that 
is the shortest (Johnson and Redish 2007; Shea 2014). Third, this off-line planning is effective 
to the degree to which internal simulations can be actually projected to actual interactions with 
the environment. That is, we could manipulate the rat’s ability to effectively plan short, cost-
effective routes through the environment by intervening in the degree to which its hippocampal 
map (and processes or manipulations performed over it) resembles structurally the terrain (and 
possible routes that the rat could take in it). In other words, if the rat is to be successful at 
planning, the unfolding of simulated actions should resemble how corresponding actions would 
unfold if the rat was to actually engage in them. 
 By concentrating on the off-line use, we do not mean to suggest that S-representations 
are restricted to the domain of off-line cognition (see also note 8). The satellite navigation 
example mentioned before is a case in point: here, the S-representation controls an ongoing, 
direct interaction with the world (if this case still counts as off-line, then only in some rather 
minimal sense). This point can be generalized to encompass purely subpersonal cases. 
Mechanisms can use S-representations to regulate on-line interactions with the environment. 
Imagine a cognitive system whose internal states change concurrently to changes in the external 
environment, and control behavior so that it is adaptive given the circumstances. Someone 
might, mistakenly, consider it to be a detector system, not that different from a simple 
thermostat. However, when we investigate the system’s workings, it turns out that its internal 
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machinery is cut off from the target; it has no sensory apparatus. What explains its successful 
behavior is that it has an internal structure that continuously simulates the changing 
environment. This simulation is not a matter of responding to the target. Rather, it is an 
endogenously controlled process whose unfolding resembles the relevant dynamics in the 
environment, enabling the system to behave in accordance with the world it inhabits. The best, 
and, in fact, the only way to explain how the system manages to cope with the environment is 
to point to similarity between its internal processes and processes in the environment. Hence, 
despite working in a purely on-line manner, the system in question turns out to employ an S-
representation of its environment. 
Lastly, it needs to be noted that no real-life S-representational system, even one whose 
cognitive processes unfold in a purely on-line manner, would work if it were completely 
unresponsive to the changes in the external environment. It would be impossible for such an 
encapsulated agent to detect and correct errors in the endogenous simulation of the 
environment, which could lead to catastrophic consequences. It is much more reasonable to 
postulate a mixed strategy which combines detector-based and S-representation-based ways of 
dealing with the environment on-line (as is the case in satellite-based navigation). What we 
mean is a system that simulates the environment but is at the same time equipped with response-
selective detectors. The internal model could make predictions about the way the detectors will 
be affected by states of the world, with the mismatch between that prediction and feedback that 
is actually generated serving as a way of “measuring” the representational error. This sort of 
prediction-error-based cognitive strategy is postulated by recent predictive processing 
approaches to cognition (Clark 2013; Friston and Stephan 2007; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013). 
According to the predictive processing story, on-line perception and action are underpinned by 
an internal generative model which encodes the causal-probabilistic structure of the organism-
external environment (reference omitted). The model is constantly updated in a way that aims 
at simulating the ongoing changes in the environment, and it constantly predicts incoming 
sensory stimuli (hence the qualification “generative”). Updating and prediction are endogenous 
in nature, as the updating crucially depends on pre-stored likelihood and prior probability 
distributions, and the predictions are trafficked in a top-down manner. Thus, the generative 
model constitutes an endogenous source of control of perception and action. However, as 
mentioned, the process of internal simulation could go catastrophically astray if it were 
impossible for it to get corrected in case of error. And here is where detectors come into play. 
In predictive processing, the sensory system is reliably causally dependent on the environment 
(hence, acts as a detector of sorts), and the difference between its actual states and internally 
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generated predictions results in a prediction error signal, which is propagated in a bottom-up 
manner. This way the internal model can be corrected in light of the prediction error. In other 
words, the S-representation (the generative model) and detectors (the sensory apparatus) work 
together. To generalize this point, although S-representations are not detectors, they will 
sometimes need detectors to help them with their representational duties. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, we attempted to clarify the claim that internal representations are S-
representations. First, we proposed a mechanist-interventionist interpretation of the idea of 
similarity as an “exploitable” relation. This interpretation appeals to the causal role that 
similarity plays in enabling the successful operation of cognitive mechanisms. Second, we 
provided reasons for thinking that S-representations are indeed a separate type of 
representation, distinct from purported indicator or detector representations. On the view that 
we opted for, the key to this distinction lies in the fact that (1) S-representations’ workings 
depend on the structural similarity in a way that is not the case with detectors, and (2) they 
constitute an endogenous source of control that exhibits a degree of functional freedom from 
states of the environment. Overall, we hope that our proposals further pave the way that leads 
away from seeing representations as a matter of reacting to the world detector-style, and 
towards the idea that representing the world is a matter of actively modeling it. 
 Before we close the discussion, there is one last issue that merits mention. Some authors 
have argued that the domain in which S-representations can be explanatory is restricted to low-
level cognition and that S-representations are not quite suited to explain more sophisticated, 
human-level cognitive capacities (Morgan 2014; see also Garzón and Rodriguez 2009). Notice, 
however, that our approach assumes relatively minimal, empirically uncommitted criteria of 
what counts as an S-representation. Because of this, our criteria can be met by internal structures 
that vary, perhaps drastically, in terms of their cognitive sophistication. There are a couple 
dimensions along which there could be such variance. First, the vehicles of S-representations 
can vary in their relational complexity (and there should be corresponding variance in the 
complexity of their representational objects). Second, the manipulations performed over those 
vehicles can vary in their dynamic or computational complexity. Third, S-representations can 
differ in how decoupled from the environment they are; i.e., they can function in a way that is 
more or less off-line. Fourth, perhaps a case could be made that flexibility and context-
dependence of components that act as consumers of S-representations can vary (see Cao 2012). 
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Now, if we agree that S-representations differ along those dimensions, what we end up with is 
a continuum of S-representations of increasing sophistication. If this is a workable position—
and we see no reason to doubt this—then it should no longer be mysterious how S-
representations could underlie both simple and phylogenetically old cognitive capacities, as 
well as complex capacities that are phylogenetically new and perhaps even human-specific, 
such as reasoning, imagery, or mental time travel. Roughly, more sophisticated cognitive 
functions are underpinned by more sophisticated S-representations. In fact, our own empirical 
bet is that human-level off-line cognition is largely a matter of being equipped with highly 
sophisticated S-representations—S-representations that actually earn the status of “mental 
models.” 
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